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ABSTRACT 
The Nigerian state since independence has been bedeviled by electoral 
violence. The use of security forces and advocacy in the media by 
government and its agencies, and other measures have so far failed in 
stemming electoral violence in the country. This study therefore attempts 
to situate the role of traditional rulers in curbing electoral violence in the 
country. Using the structural functionalism theoretical framework and 
relying on personal observation as a primary source of data as well as 
secondary sources of data, the study found out that the major causes of 
electoral violence in the country are a consequence of the failure of 
contemporary security measures, media advocacy and also lack of 
mentoring of its citizens by relevant institutions and government's present 
methods. The study recommends that giving traditional rulers and their 
institutions this role of mentoring their subjects on the dangers of 
electoral violence, and also establishing an 'indirect homeland security 
system' will assist in curbing electoral violence in the counhy. It also 
recommends that traditional rulers should withdraw and refuse honours 
to people who indulge in electoral violence as well as call to order 
perpetrators and sponsors of electoral violence. 
Keywords: Traditional Rulers and Institutions, Elections, Electoral 
Violence, Nigeria. 
Introduction 
Elections in the Nigerian state from 1951 till date have been replete with 
electoral violence. Rather than elections being embraced as one of the 
important processes that strengthen democratic institutions and facilitate 
peaceful transition of power, the Nigerian political class sees election as a 
violent means of acquiring power. Previous elections conducted after 
independence till date, except the June 12 elections of 1993, were marked 
by widespread violence and intimidation (Machika, 2009). Efforts by 
successive governments in Nigeria to stem electoral violence have so far 
proved abortive. Government, over the years, has employed reactive rather 
than proactive tactics in its attempt to stem electoral violence. These 
measures by government, which include the use of media advocacy, 
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presence of secu1ity personnel during the election processes, the arrest and 
prosecution of small electoral violence perpetuators among others, have, so 
far, proved insufficient in stemming the incidences of electoral violence in 
the country. 
The Nigerian land area before the advent of colonialism was dotted by 
largely peaceful and well-coordinated nationalities. These ethnic 
nationalities also, dming the period of colonialism, witnessed relative 
peaceful coexistence, the activities of nationalists notwithstanding. The 
relative peace experienced by these ethnic nationalities before and during 
colonial time was achieved as a result of the dominant roles of traditional 
rulers and their institutions. The processes of constitutional development in 
the country saw the roles of traditional institutions in maintaining peace and 
stability in their various nationalities waning, giving way to new modes of 
maintaining same. 
Taking the historicity of electoral violence in Nigeria into consideration, it 
is obvious that the present governmental approach used in curbing electoral 
violence has, so far, proven inadequate. These approaches, as earlier 
mentioned, include the joint deployment of security forces, media 
campaigns, mobilizing religious and other opinion leaders, appeal to 
students and youths directly and through their parents, closure of schools 
and, sometimes, imposition of curfew. The need, therefore, to employ 
traditional values and institutions to complement these aforementioned 
efforts to curb electoral violence is now very imperative. 
Clarification of Concepts 
Traditional Rulers and Institutions refer to a central authority control 
selected by the people in the community, through the cultural processes and 
traditions, and accepted by the people to control cultural and traditional 
affairs not covered by governmental laws and regulations. That is, an · 
authority that pilots the people in a community along the lines of customs 
and traditions in the community. (I'raditional Rulers and Chiefs Edict, 
1979). 
A traditional ruler may be defined as, "the traditional head of an ethnic 
group or clan who is the holder of the highest primary executive authority 
in an indigenous polity or who has been appointed to the position in 
accordance with the customs and traditions of the area concerned by 
instrument or order of the state government, and whose title is recognized 
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as a traditional ruler by the Government of the State" (Traditional Rulers 
and Chiefs Edict. 1979). 
An election is a formal decision-making process by which a population 
chooses an individual to hold public office (Encyclopedia Britannica, 
2009). Robert and Edward (2014) define election as 'a method for the 
selection of persons to fill certain offices through choices made by an 
electorate or by those citizens who are qualified to vote under the rules and 
procedures of the electoral system'. 
The International Foundation for Electoral System, IFES, defines Electoral 
Violence as: 
any act of threat of physical or psychological harm to a person, or damage 
to property directed at anyone directly involved in an electoral process 
(voter, candidate, party officer, election worker, election monitor, 
journalist, etc), which may disrupt or attempt to disrupt any aspect of the 
electoral process (registration, campaign, voting, counting, collating, etc.) 
(Machika, 2009:1). 
According to Machika (2009), Electoral Violence can be seen as any 
random or organized act that seeks to undermine, delay, or othetwise 
influence an electoral process through threats, verbal intimidation, hate 
speech, disinformation, physical assault and blackmail, destruction of 
property or assassination. He further posited that the victims of electoral 
violence can be people, places, things or data. The acts associated with 
electoral violence include physical harm (hon1icide, sexual violence, 
torture, and assault), threats (physical or verbal), intimidation, destruction 
of property and forced displacement. The general objective of electoral 
violence, according to him, is to influence the electoral process and its 
outcome by an individual or group of individuals over another with the aim 
of winning political competition or power through violence. 
Theoretical Framework 
The structural functionalism theoretical framework best explains the role of 
traditional institutions in curbing electoral violence. The theory is 
associated with Emile Durkheim and more recently with Talcott Parsons 
(Fisher, 2010:75). Susser (1992) states that functionalists tend to view 
social and political units in more holistic and organic terms. Social 
practices are said to have a functional role in sustaining the system as a 
whole. Functionalists equate structure to anatomy and functions to 
physiology of organisms. 
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The structural functional paradigm views society as a complex system of 
many separate but integrated parts (Obi, 2008:25). The theory is based 
around a number of key concepts. First, society is viewed as a system; a 
collection of interdependent parts, with a tendency towards equilibrium. 
Secondly, there are functional requirements that must be met in a society 
for its smvival (such as reproduction of the population). Thirdly, 
phenomena are seen to exist because they serve a function (Holmwood, 
2005:87). 
Functionalists believe that one can compare society to a living organism, in 
that both are made up of interdependent working parts (organs and systems) 
that must function together in order for the greater body to perform 
optimally. According to Parsons (1961 :41), "the social system is made up 
of the actions of individuals". His starting point was the interaction 
between two individuals (Parsons, 1961). Those individuals were faced 
with a variety of choices about how they might act. However, those choices 
were influenced and constrained by a number of physical and social factors 
(Craib, 1992:40). Parsons (1961) determined that each individual has 
expectations of the other' s action and reaction to their own behaviour, and 
that these expectations are derived from the accepted nonns and values of 
the society which they inhabit. He then developed the idea of roles into 
collectivities that complemented each other in fulfilling functions of 
society. Some of the roles are bound up in institutions and social structures 
such as economic, educational, legal, etc. (Parsons 1961 :41 ). 
Parsons (1982) also argued that the primary concern of Durkheim was the 
integration of social system that holds society together. Parsons argued that 
the construct of ' social solidarity' was central to Durkheim's work as it was 
to his own solidarity derived from no1ms bolstered by shared values 
(Kingsbury & Scanzoni, 1993:200). Those constructs were viewed as 
'needs' of social structure that help explain cultural phenomena such as 
kinship rules and religious rituals (Tun1er, 1986). 
The structural functionalism theoretical framework is relevant to this study 
from the perspective that traditional rulers have socially defined roles and 
responsibilities that they must render to their communities. From the point 
of structures and institutions, traditional rulers serve as a means to organize 
social pa.its. It is common knowledge that traditional values in the Nigerian 
context influence and constrain the action of its subjects. The Nigerian 
traditional setting, to a very large extent, accentuates laws, rules and 
regulations among its members. One of the responsibilities of traditional 
124 
n,e Role of Traditional Rulers in Curbing Electoral I "iolence in ,\ 'igeria 
rulers is to ensure that peace is maintained in their domain. Electoral 
violence is inimical to the peaceful existence of any society. Traditional 
institutions, therefore, have the important role of ensuring that electoral 
violence and indeed other violence in the society are minimized. 
Electoral Violence: Some Trends and Consequences 
The violent outcome of the electoral processes in Nigeria took a frightening 
dimension with the 1964 general election. The election was marred by 
widespread rigging and malpractice that culminated in violence and 
extensive riots which paved the way for the 1966 military coup. 
ln l 979, though rigging was competitive between the five political parties, 
that is, the Unity Party of Nigeria (UPN), the National Party of Nigeria 
(NPN), the Great Nigerian Peoples Party (GNPP), the Peoples Redemption 
Party (PRP) and the Nigerian Peoples Party (NPP), electoral violence was 
minimal. The 1979 election was midwifed by the military regime of 
General Olusegun Obasanjo (Tgbuzor, 2009). 
The 1983 election, the second organized by a civilian government (the first 
being the 1964 election), also witnessed massive vote rigging and attendant 
electoral violence. The general public's outcry that followed the 'landslide 
victory' of Alhaji Shehu Shagari-led National Party of Nigeria (NPN), 
resulted in the December, 31st 1983 military coup. The magnitude of the 
violence in Ondo State for example, made it impossible for the declared 
winner of the Ondo State governorship election, Chief Akin Omoboriowo, 
to assume office. He governed the state from another state - Lagos 
(Igbuzor, 2009). 
The general election of 2003 (the third organized by a civilian regime in the 
country), midwifed by the Olusegun Obasanjo-led government also 
witnessed widespread electoral violence. This was a consequence of the 
'do-or-die' stance of President Olusegun Obasanjo towards winning the 
election. According to the Human Rights Watch report on the 2003 general 
elections, series of large scale violence were recorded during the April 12th 
and 19th elections in several key areas including the south and the south 
east. According to the report, the highest level of violence during the 2003 
elections was recorded in the south and south east, where the People's 
Democratic Party (PDP) governors and their supporters greatly succeeded 
in resisting opposition bids for office (Human Rights fVatch, 2003) 
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The 2004 Local Government Elections also witnessed extensive electoral 
violence. By the end of March 2004> Human Rights Watch noted at least 22 
states in which killings and other types of violent clashes were recorded by 
election observers, journalists and other sources. In late March and early 
April 2004, there were reports of further incidents including killings, some 
of which have been linked with the aftermath of the elections (Human 
Rights Watch, 2004). The Daily Champion of 30th March 2004 reported the 
violence in Edo State two days after the local government election. The 
Associated Press, April 12th 2004 edition reported how Nigerian youths 
battled secu1ity forces over disputed election results in the south west. 
On December 8th 2006, seven persons were killed and several houses burnt 
in Aliade Town, forty kilometers ( 40km) away from Makurdi, capital of 
Benue State during the People's Democratic Party (PDP) primaries to pick 
candidates for the national election of 2007 (Reuters Foundation, 2006). It 
is an open secret that the 2007 election was marred by massive vote fraud 
and rigging. The beneficiary of that election, late Alhaji Musa Y ar' Adua 
confirmed that the process that brought him to power was widely flawed. 
Igbuzor (2009) categorized trends of electoral violence in N igeria as 
fo llows: 
1. General elections of 1959 and 1964 (Wild Wild West) : Illegal 
voting, bribery and falsification of results 
11. 1979: Competitive rigging (a situation where the better rigger wins) 
111. 1983 Election: Competitive rigging 
iv. 1999: Competitive rigging 
v. 2003: Primitive accumulation of votes 
vi. 2007: Direct capture of the people ' s mandate 
In 2008, 400 persons were killed and 7,000 others displaced in Jos, Plateau 
State over disputed election results. Clu-istian and Musliln protesters took to 
the streets, burning homes and places of worship (Headlines Africa, 2008). 
Nkwocha (2008:8) reported that Jonah Jang, the Gove1nor of Plateau State 
imposed a 24-hour curfew on Jos over the massive riots involving 
Christians and Muslims over the· results of a local election. Two days of 
rioting left 400 injured and 381 killed. According to him, the Nigerian Red 
Cross reported that over ten thousand people fled their homes due to the 
riots, which were occasioned by rumours that the candidate of the People' s 
Democratic Party (PDP), Barr. T . G. Buba defeated the candidate of the All 
Nigerian Peoples Party (ANPP). People from the largely Hausa Muslim 
community, he repo1ied, began protesting as a result of the rumours and 
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attacked Christian homes and churches, and the Christians on their part 
retaliated (Nkwocha, 2008). 
According to Adesote and Abimbola (2014), the 201 1 General Election 
witnessed two major stages of electoral violence, the pre-election period 
and the post-election period. According to them, there were several cases of 
pre-election violence which led to the brutal murder of some people. Tht!y 
cited the pre-election violence in Akwa Ibom State in March, 22, 2011, 
which led to the setting up of a presidential investigation panel to 
investigate the remote and immediate causes of the violence and proffer 
solution to nip future occurrences in the bud. Adesote and Abirnbola (2014) 
also stated that the announcement of the April 2011 General Election by 
!NEC at the national level, in which President Goodluck Jonathan of the 
People's Democratic Party (PDP) was declared winner, led to post-electoral 
violence especially in some parts of northern Nigeria, such as Bauchi, 
Yobe, Maiduguri, Kaduna, among others. According to them, the 2011 
post-election violence led to the killing of about ten (10) National Youth 
Service Corps (NYSC) members in Bauchi State (Abimbola & Adesote, 
2012). 
Bamgbose (2012:213) summarized the incidence of the 201 1 electoral 
violence as follows: 
1. Ondo State: 3 people shot dead in Obanla area with 4 people 
reportedly injured in lro Street in a clash between supporters of the 
People' s Democratic Party (PDP) and the ruling Labour Party (LP). 
11. Ado-Ekiti: 2 supporters of Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) identified 
as Ayo Kehinde Faluyi and Michael Jpindola were killed by assassins 
during a brawl between the supporters of the People's Democratic 
Party (PDP) and the then ruling Action Congress of Nigeria (CAN) 
(now the All Progressives Congress, APC). 
111. Osun State: 6 members of the Action Congress of Nigeria (ACN) (now 
APC) were arrested and anaigned at the Magistrate Court at Oshogbo 
over alleged arson and political violence. 
1v. Akwa Thom State: clashes between supporters of the People's 
Democratic Party (PDP) and the Action Congress of Nigeria (ACN) 
(now APC) resulted in many deaths with several persons wounded. 
The Presidential Campaign Office of Goodluck Jonathan and Namadi 
Sambo situated along Abak Road were set ablaze. 127 Peugeot 307 
salon cars and 157 Keke NAPEP [tricycles] belonging to the state 
govenunent were burnt. 51 suspects were arrested in connection with 
the political violence in Uyo. 
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v. Edo State: Protest came over U1e way the People· s Democratic Party 
(PDP) primaries wen~ l:uuducted. Matthew Urhoghidc who lost to 
Ehigie Uzamere alleged that he won. 1n Edo Central, Theo Oko and 
Onikolease Erhabor both claimed victory as they alleged that the 
announced wim1er, Herberta Okonofua rigged the process. 
vi. Cross River State: At Ugep, there was electoral violence and some 
people were injured and cars destroyed, while guns were freely used. 
The violence led to the arrest of one of the aspirants to ilie House of 
Representatives, Mr. Patrick Okomiso and the incumbent member, 
Chief Bassey Ewa. 
vu. Delta State: The rescheduled Delta-North senatorial distTict primary 
was marred by sporadic gunshots at the cenotaph venue, Asaba. The 
state chairman of the party, Chief Peter Onyeluka Nwaoboshi escaped 
being lynched by some angry delegates during the senatorial re-run. 
vut. Ebonyi State: Suspected thugs loyal to a political party unleashed 
terror on St. Stephen's Catholic Church, Iziogo, Izzi Local 
Government Area. 
1x. Benue State: The convoy of the then Benue State Deputy Governor, 
Stephen Lawani, ran into an ambush by armed political iliugs on ilieir 
way back from a rally in Gbajimba, Guma Local Governn1ent Area. 
Political thugs in Benue State also attacked and wounded General 
Lawrence Onoja, the then Benue South Action Congress of Nigeria 
(ACN, now APC) senatorial candidate. 
x. Niger State: In Suleja, hand-held explosives were thrown into the 
venue of the Niger East senatorial flag-off by unidentified persons. 
Also in Niger Stale, angry youths protesting the results of the 2011 
General Election, stormed the Nigerian Christian Carpers Secretariat 
in Minna and locked 50 youth corpers serving in the State in the 
building and set it ablaze. 
On the rescheduled April 2013 Esan Norlh-East Local Government Area 
Election in Edo State, the exercise was cancelled by the Edo State 
Independent Electoral Commission (EDSIEC) over alleged violence and 
thuggery in many places. EDSIEC officials were chased away and the 
electoral officer took refuge at the Uromi Police Station. The activities of 
thugs and some law enforcement agencies made it impossible for EDSIEC 
officials to perform their duties. (Otabor, 2013: 1- 2) 
Ebegbulem and Enogholase (2013) reported that the in October 2013 
bye-election in Esan North-East area of Edo State, two persons were 
allegedly caught with already thump-printed ballot boxes while 22 
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others were arrested for alleged disturbances and taken to Uromi 
Police Station where they were detained. According to them, Prince 
Joe Okojie, an APC leader, who spoke to the newsmen, where he 
was detained at the Uromi Police Station. complained thus: 
I ca1ne to the police station to lay a complaint. l later left to my 
polling unit to bring a camera which I intended to give to somebody 
at the station. As I was corning back, the Mopol Commander who is 
based in Lagos but came back home to work for the PDP, ambushed 
me and some other APC leaders and brought all of us to the police 
station. They dis1upted the election in my ward, ward 5 and ward 7, 
when they found out that they were los ing. We knew this would 
happen because they flooded this town with Mobile policemen from 
Abuja and Lagos and they are intiinidating, harassing and a1Testing 
APC leaders. But we will resist this intimidation. Their PDP leader, 
the minister is around. They came with thousands of mobile 
policemen to kill our people but they have fa iled. (Ebegbulem & 
Enogholase, 2013: 1- 2). 
Ebegbulern and Enogholasc (2013: 4) further reported that, at Atani 
Pri1nary School, the camera of Tell Magazine 's Director of Special 
Duties, Mrs. Adekunbi Ero, was alleged ly snatched from h er as she 
attempted to take photographs of the chaotic scene caused by 
political thugs. A reporter with The News Magazine, Jethro Ebileke, 
was also allegedly rough-handled. 
Fafowora (2013), in his report on the November 2013 Anambra State 
Governorship Election, stated that the election ended in utter confusion and 
chaos. According to Fafowora (2013 ), voting did not take place in many of 
the voting centres. Voting materials anived very late in many of the 
centres. In many places, voters' registers were either not available or 
displayed. Where they were available, many of the voters could not find 
their names and consequently, could not vote. The security agencies, 
particularly the (Federal) police, were accused of complicity in the massive 
electoral fraud in the state election. Many voters were allegedly denied 
access by the police to the voting centres. Some who were thought to be in 
supp011 of the opposition parties were manhandled and not allowed to vote 
(Fafowora, 2013). 
Prior to the 2014 Governorship election in Ekiti State, series of violent 
clashes between rival political parties became the order of the day. On 
several occasions, thugs allegedly sent by a rival party clashed with those 
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they felt were obstacles to the chances of their party at the polls. Few 
unlucky members lost their lives in the ensuing melee, while some who 
were fortunate, escaped with injuries (Okoro, 2014:3) 
lbekwe (2014) posited that seeking elective positions in Ekiti State is not 
for the faint-hearted . Historically, elections in the state have been ma.tTed 
by violence, intimidations and long-drawn legal tussles. According to him, 
police attack on the governor of the state, Kayode Fayemi, and other 
members of the All Progressives Congress, APC, during a rally in Ado-
Ekiti, on Sunday June 11 2014, might be a new blow; it was no doubt in 
tune with what, unfortunately, had become the nom1 in the state. Witnesses 
said hell broke loose after men of the Mobile Police unit shot teargas 
canisters and live ammunition into the crowd. A supporter of the gove1nor, 
Taiwo Akinola, died after he was shot in the head. The APC claimed that 
the attack on the governor was unprovoked and was orchestrated by the 
opposition Peoples Democratic Party, PDP. In fact, Dr. Fayemi told 
journalists that the attack could be an attempt to assassinate h..im. The 
decibel of accusations and counter-accusations of violence, threats and 
intimidations had become almost deafening after official campaigns 
commenced. There had never been a lull in clashes an1ong the various 
opposing political interests in the state (Ibekwe, 2014) 
In November 2013, Fw1sho Oguudare, a supporter of Opeyemi Bamidele, 
the Labom Party, LP, gove1norship candidate, was shot and killed after 
clashes between Mr. Bamidele's suppmters and people believed to be APC 
members at Emure Ekiti. A member of the Ekiti State House of Assembly 
from Emure Constituency, Kehinde Boluwade, with six other APC 
members were charged with murder over the killing. This led Governor 
Fayemi to suspend his campaigns, alleging that the incessant attacks on his 
supporters were sponsored by the opposition (Ibekwe, 2014). 
Conversely, Ayo Fayose, a former governor and PDP candidate also 
complained of intin1idations and threats against his supporters mainly by 
the APC. While reacting to the June 11, 2014 attack on Dr. Fayemi's rally 
and the allegation that the PDP orchestrated the clash, Mr.· Fayose told 
reporters that one of his supporters was attacked and killed by 
machete-wielding members of the APC. He accused Dr. Fayemi of 
preventing police officers from getting to the scene of the incident by 
blocking them with his official cars (lbekwe, 2014:1-2). According to 
Ibekwe (2014), nothing was more symbolic of the overriding theme of 
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violence that had underscored the election like the bulletproof vest worn by 
Mr. Fayose to one of his campaign rallies. 
Okoro (2014) justified the Federal Government's deployment of about 
12,000 troops including soldiers, men of the Nigeria Security and Civil 
Defence Corps (NSCDC), State Security Services (SSS) and police officers 
on the pockets of violent clashes before the Ekiti elections. A week before 
the election, the Inspector-General of Police (IGP), Mohammed Abubakar. 
deployed three helicopters for surveillance in the three senatorial districts in 
the state with one Assistant Inspector-General of Police and four 
Commissioners of Police for effective coordination of security operations. 
Abubakar confessed that the number of troops, armoured tanks and 
helicopters deployed in Ekiti was the highest ever to be deployed in a state, 
saying it was part of the resolve of Lhe police to do anything humanly 
possible to provide enough security during the elections (Okoro, 20 l 4:3) 
Okoro (2014) likened Ekiti to a war zone with the troops taking positions. 
Almost every 100 metres from the entry point of the state, police officers 
and soldiers mounted various check-points, with blood-hound dogs sniffing 
for any likely breach of peace by supporters of the various political parties. 
Some visitors corning into the state through Efon Alaaye-Ekiti on the Osun-
Ekiti border, encountered at least eleven check-points before getting to 
Ado-Ekiti, the state capital (Okoro, 2014:3). 
The Nigerian Military barred the opposition party, All Progressives 
Congress (APC) state gove1nors from entering Ekiti State two days before 
the election. What seemed to have bothered political observers about the 
military invasion in Ekiti, according to Okoro (2014), was the incident that 
transpired 48 hours before the elections. Rivers State Governor, Rotimi 
Amaechi, and his Edo State counterpart, Adams Oshiomhole, were 
prevented entry into Ekiti State to attend the last APC mega rally by 
military personnel purportedly acting on the orders of the Presidency. 
Some leaders of the party, including the Imo State governor, Rochas 
Okorocha, and the former governor of Lagos State, Bola Tinubu, also had 
their fair share of frustration as their planes were prevented from taking off 
at the Akure airport after the rally, leaving them with the only option of 
travelling by road. Governor Adams Oshiomhole, who intended flying to 
Ekiti by a helicopter, was prevented from taking off at the Benin airport, 
while the plane flying the Kano State governor, Rabiu Kwankwaso to the 
Akure airport was prevented from landing (Okoro, 2014:4). 
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Gove1nor Rotimi Amaechi of Rivers State was the most frustrated of them. 
He had managed to fly to Akure in a chartered plane, but could not reach 
Ado-Ekiti as soldiers laid siege for him in lju, Ondo State, forcing him to 
tum back; condemning him to a four-hour trip to Lagos by road. His 
aircraft was reportedly grounded in Akure. Governor Oshiomhole, it was 
learnt, could however not get to his destination as the Federal Government 
aborted his trip midway (Okoro, 2014: 4-5). 
As would be expected, the action of the military on its members drew the 
ire of the APC. The party lamented that the Federal Gove1nment was using 
its security apparatus to harass its governors and had thus turned Ekiti State 
into a war zone where constih1tionally guaranteed rights have been 
suspended. 
The National Chairman of the APC, Chief John Odigie-Oyegun, who 
addressed a press conference in Lagos on the eve of the election, said the 
Federal Gove1nment had overreached itself and engaged in series of 
arbitrariness and unconstitutional acts that threaten the very fabric of the 
nation's democracy. Odigie-Oyegun particularly lamented the action of the 
n1ilitary on its governors and supporters, saying that: 
The party was concerned about the actions of the PDP-led Federal 
Government 'to capture Ekiti State at all cost'. It is unfortunate that under 
the guise of providing security, Ekiti State has been tU1ned into a war zone. 
It has been over-run by armed security personnel with the intention of 
intimidating the opposition and the voters as well. Our electoral laws are 
clear that every polling unit should have one unarmed policeman and the 
nlilitary should have no role in the election. But in Ekiti, armed police and 
military personnel have been deployed in their numbers and the question 
we are asking is whose purpose are they going to serve? The PDP is too 
desperate to capture Ekiti by every means and in view of this, we have 
deemed it fit to alert Nigerians of their antic (Okoro, 2014: 5-6). 
However, President Goodluck Jonathan's Senior Special Assistant on 
Public Affairs, Dr. Do yin Okupe, absolved his principal of blame over the 
incident, saying that at no time did-the president order that the governors be 
stopped from participating in tbe mega rally (Okoro, 2014:6). 
At least, 58 Nigerians died in pre-election violence ahead of the general 
polls that was scheduled for March 28 and April 11, 2015, according to a 
report released by the Nigerian Human Rights body. The report on pre-
election violence compiled by the National Human Rights Commission 
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indicate that in 50 days, 61 incidents of pre-election violence occwTed in 22 
states of Nigeria with 58 persons killed. The incidences of violence, the 
Commission reported, were captured from all the six geopolitical zones in 
Nigeria (Ibeh. 2015: 1 ). 
Akasike (2015:12) reported that two(2) persons were shot dead in the 
Ogba/Egbema/ Ndoni Local Government Area of Rivers State in a clash 
between supporters of the People's Democratic Party (PDP) and those of 
the All Progressives Congress (APC). The incident, which took place in 
Omoku, was said to be a reprisal after an initial violent clash that took place 
in Okwuzi. The Editor, Punch Online (2015:1), also reported that two (2) 
persons were killed at lmiegba, near Auchi, Etsako West Local 
Government Area of Edo State as supporters of the Social Democratic 
Patiy (SDP) and the All Progressives; Congress (APC) clashed. According 
to the report, the incident occuned on Monday, 23rd March, 2015 during a 
door-to-door campaign by the SDP. The APC members were alleged to 
have barricaded the road leading to Lmiegba with a view to preventing 
Honourable Razak Momoh of the Federal House of Representatives from 
accessing the town. 
Ranti (2015) reported that the All Progressives Congress (APC) petitioned 
the National Human Rights Commission (NHRC) over the alleged attacks 
on its members and supporters in Ekiti State by Governor Ayo Fayose and 
his loyalists. The party accused Fayose of using thugs to cause political 
violence in the state. lt added that the thugs physically attacked and 
intimidated opposition personalities in the state. The APC also alleged that 
Fayose's activities were undermining the peace pact recently signed by all 
presidential candidates in the March 28, 2015 general elections. They 
alleged that on January 21, 2015, Fayose's thugs and members of the Odua 
Peoples ' Congress (OPC), dressed in anny and police uniform ransacked 
and vandalized the APC Secretariat in Agiloson Street, Ado-Ekiti, where 
the security guards on duty at the APC office were physically assaulted. 
They also alleged that on January 24th, 2015, Adeleke Samson, a Student 
Union leader, who attended the APC presidential rally in Ado-Ekiti with 
his colleagues, was violently attacked by Fayose's Umgs. 
Ogundele (2015) further reported that the All Progressives Congress (APC) 
in Ekiti State called on the Independent National Electoral Commission to 
charge the executive governor of the state, Mr. Ayodele Fayose, for 
election-related violence. The party, according to Ogundele, based the call 
on the reported shooting of an APC member, Jide Owolabi, in Ikire-Ekiti 
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on the alleged order of the deputy governor during the 2015 Presidential 
and National Assembly elections. According to the APC, ·'What happened 
in Ikire-Ekiti was a pre-meditated incident to cow the opposition to 
submission. We had earlier raised ala1m to the plan by top officials of 
Governor Ayodele Fayose's administration to employ violence and 
intimidation to cow our members to enable them manipulate the elections". 
Adenubi (2015:46) also reported that pandemonium broke out around the 
national stadium axis of Surulere. Lagos, when suspected thugs, loyal to the 
All Progressive Congress (APC), clashed with mernbers of the Odua 
Peoples' Congress (OPC), attacking motorists plying the road. According 
to an eyewitness. the report added, trouble ensued when members of the 
OPC, loyal to Ganiyu Adams, clashed with suppmters of the APC who 
were on a solidarity march. 
Causes of Electoral Violence 
Machika (2009) attributed the causes of electoral violence to include the 
following: 
1. Financial .inducement 
u. The plum of office 
111. Attraction of official lucre 
1v. Illiteracy, ignorance and poverty 
v. Monetization of elective offices and god-fatherism 
vi. Sit-tight syndrome 
vii. Breach of trust by election management bodies 
viii. Religious and ethnic sentiments 
Machika (2009) summarized these causes into one - Lack of mentor;ng. 
According to him, society has left the training of its youth entirely to their 
immediate parents who are too busy trying to scrap a living for survival as 
opposed to the past where young men were supported by more experienced 
members of the society who train, guide and advise them to follow the path 
of honour. 
The Influence of Traditional Rulers in the Nigerian Society 
The various nationalities that make up the Nigerian state before and during 
colonialism, as earlier stated, experienced relative peace and tranquility to 
some extent. These could be attributed to the role and influence of 
traditional rulers and traditional institutions. The relative peace (aside 
nationalists' activities) in the colonial societies of N igeria was, largely, a 
consequence of the Indirect Rule System. The Indirect Rule System 
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allowed for the colonial governance of society through traditional rulers 
and institutions. Constitutional development in the Nigerian state after 
independence did not, however, give much role to traditional rulers. Apart 
from the creation of the Council of Chiefs (who were to act in advisory 
capacity) which was in place in the 1963 and 1979 constitutions, no role 
was given to traditional rulers in the country. 
It is a truism that, to a great extent, traditional rulers in Nigeria still have 
control and influence over their domains today. The coru1ection between 
these traditional institutions and the people are still intact to some extent. 
The passage of time and contemporary governmental influences have not 
significantly waned or diminished the influence of traditional rulers over 
their subjects in their present respective domains. They still remain highly 
respected and very influential. This pervading influence of traditional rulers 
should be positively harnessed by giving them roles aimed at mediating and 
curbing electoral violence in their respective areas. 
Blench et al (2006) captured succinctly, the super-in1posing roles and 
influences of traditional rulers in conflict prevention and mediation in the 
northern patt of Nigeria. According to them: 
1. Traditional rulers in Kwara Emirate in Kwara State were responsible 
for the settlement of the Later Farmers/ Pastoralist Conflict. 
11. The Borgu Emirate Council and Kantagora Emirate Council intervened 
and settled the Grazing Rights Conflict in Kainji National Park. 
111. The Fish Resources Conflict between Silatne at1d Augie communities in 
Kebbi State in I 996 was resolved by the Argungu Emirate Council, 
among others. 
It is instructive to note that gove11llllent failed in resolving all the 
aforementioned conflicts. The influence of traditional n1lers from their 
successes at conflict resolution and mediation, therefore, cannot be 
over-emphasized. 
Ibrahim (2009) situates the pervading influence of traditional rulers when 
he posited that during the colonial period, it was impossible to steal from 
the native authority treasury as there was accountability and transparency 
under the emirate system. This resonates with Ekeh' s (1975) position in his 
seminal work, 'Colonialism and the Two Publics in Africa: A Theoretical 
Statement'. According to him, a community may not sanction a thief who 
steals from the government, but will sanction one who steals from the 
con1munity. 
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Traditional Rulers and Curbing of Electoral Violence 
Traditional authorities employ various methods aimed at curbing electoral 
violence in Nigeria, and some of these methods are highlighted below: 
Mentoring 
Traditional rulers should be allotted space in curbing electoral violence by 
involving them tlu-ough their various traditional institutions in the 
mentoring of their subjects on the calamitous consequence of electoral 
violence. As a result of their widespread influences in their respective 
domains, traditional rulers can mentor their subjects on ethics and 
behaviour during registration of voters, electoral campaigns and general 
conduct and behaviour on election and post-election days. lt is a known fact 
that political aspirants traditionally seek the support and blessings of 
traditional rulers before embarking on electoral campaigns. Traditional 
rulers can also through this process mentor, advise and influence these 
aspirants from engaging in any form of electoral violence. 
Traditional J11vocatio11s 
The fear of negative traditional invocation by traditional rulers and 
institutions will also go a long way in preventing subjects from involving 
themselves in electoral violence as most people in these parts still believe 
in the efficacy and harmful effects of these negative traditional invocations. 
The example in the Benin Kingdom where the rate of kidnapping dropped 
drastically after the Oba of Benin and his chiefs pronounced negative 
invocations on kidnappers and evil -doers in the kingdom, attest to the fact 
that many people still place high premiun1 on the efficacy of traditional 
invocations. 
Penalizing those Engaged in Electoral Violence 
Traditional rulers should penalize electoral violence perpetrators by 
withdrawing their chieftaincy titles and also deny sponsors and perpetuators 
of electoral violence such honours. Instead, such honours and chieftaincy 
titles should be given to politicians who play politics according to the rules 
and encourage peaceful elections. Traditional rulers, being close to their 
people, should call to order, perpetuators and sponsors of electoral violence 
in their domains. This call will greatly discourage the political leaders and 
their foot-soldiers who are disposed to electoral violence as the people in 
the locality will beam their searchlight on them and even refrain from 
supporting them if they do not restrain from perpetuating electoral violence. 
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Indirect Homeland Security System 
The widespread influence of traditional rulers can also be translated into 
assisting security agencies in maintaining peace, especially the curbing of 
electoral violence, through what we may refer to as 'Indirect Homeland 
Security System ·. This is a system where the traditional rulers are indirectly 
involved in the administration of security matters in their respective 
domains. This can be achieved by security agencies directing covert 
security matters tlu-ough the traditional rulers. Most people. no doubt, still 
trust their traditional rulers and therefore will be willing to give unfettered 
information to them rather than to the police or other security agencies. 
This classified information from traditional rulers and institutions to 
security agencies, will, no doubt, strengthen the relationship between these 
traditional institutions and security agencies. This collaboration will go a 
long way in stemming electoral violence and other kinds of violence in the 
respective traditional domains. 
With the Indirect Homeland Security System in place, traditional rulers and 
institutions will have unfettered access to, and can therefore call on the 
police force and other security agencies that are better empowered to check 
electoral violence and prosecute its perpetuators and sponsors whenever the 
need arises. 
Conclusions 
The magnitude of electoral violence in Nigeria, no doubt, is a threat to 
sustainable democratic norms and cultures in the country. The efforts of 
government through the use of joint deployment of security forces, media 
can1paigns, mobilizing religious and other opinion leaders, appeal to 
students and the youth through their parents, closure of schools and 
sometimes imposition of curfew, etc, to stem electoral violence in the 
country have so far proved inadequate. It is a known fact that traditional 
rulers exert a lot of influence on the citizens in their domains. Political 
actors in the country and even so-called god-fathers all belong to different 
nationalities where traditional institutions and traditional rulers are highly 
respected. The influence of these traditional rulers over their subjects are 
also not controve1ted. 
Recommendations 
Government therefore has the responsibility to take advantage of the 
influence of traditional rulers over their subjects by engaging these royal 
fathers to positively mentor their subjects tlu·ough the various traditional 
institutions towards curbing electoral violence in their respective domains. 
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Secondly, government should take ad\ antage of the people· s fear of the 
eilicacy of negative traditional invocations by traditional institutions to 
positively engage traditional rulers in stemming electoral \ iolence. 
fhe introduction of an Indirect Homeland Security System \\ ill also go a 
long ,,ay towards stemming electoral violence in the domains of traditional 
rulers since they will complement security agencies, though covertly. in 
stemming electoral violence. Replicating this nationwide will, no doubt, 
curb electoral violence in the country. The ,vithdra\\al and refusal by 
traditional rulers lo give honours to people who indulge in electoral 
violenct!, will to a large extent, encourage peaceful elections. The calling to 
order of perpetuators and sponsors of electoral violence by traditional rulers 
in their domains will, moreover. greatly discourage electoral violence. 
Lastly, the collaboration of the police and other security agencies \,·ith 
traditional rulers and institutions in the Indirect Homeland Security System 
and the call by traditional rulers to prosecute the perpetuators of electoral 
violence and their sponsors in their respective domains will significantly 
ensure peaceful polls in Nigeria. 
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